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Abstract 
We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment 
in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from  short-term 
contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto 
salaried contracts relative to those who do not.  The finding is robust to the introduction of 
worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary 
contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession.  Improved 
performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the 
higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements 
in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Although psychologists point to the inherent value of work to human beings and identify 
the beneficial impact it has on their wellbeing, the rational economic behavioural model 
underpinning labour economics equates effort with disutility. As such, economists 
assume employees are motivated by monetary rewards. Furthermore, they can be induced 
to expend greater effort in a task if those efforts are rewarded directly through 
performance-related pay. Although performance-related pay contracts are increasingly 
common, most workers receive an annual salary. If some of their income is tied to 
performance, it usually constitutes only a relatively small amount of total remuneration. 
One reason for the preponderance of salaried contracts is that workers are risk-averse and 
may be disinclined to share the risk of poor performance with their employer. Salaried 
employment minimises fluctuations in pay, thus giving workers some degree of certainty 
about their income into the future, provided they reach the performance threshold 
necessary to retain their job and provided the employer remains in business.  
 
Where workers are heterogeneous they may choose between contract types according to 
their risk preferences and their ability. Employers wishing to share risk with workers may 
be willing to pay a wage premium for performance-related contracts. More able workers 
may seek performance-related contracts in the expectation that this will provide them 
with a higher income than a standard contract (Lazear, 1986; Prendergast, 1999: 14-15). 
However, workers in a particular profession or occupation are not normally free to 
choose between contract types, either because a profession is characterised by a particular 
type of contract or because, if there are various types of contract on offer, the employer 
may be the arbiter of who manages to enter the jobs offering the “better” contracts. In this 
case employers can be expected to offer those job slots to the more talented workers. 
 
The empirical literature has made only limited progress in establishing the incentive 
effects of various contract types. This is due primarily to data limitations. The bulk of the 
literature presents quasi-experimental estimates of switches in payment regimes at the 
level of the firm, often based on personnel data from a single case study firm, or a set of 
firms in a particular industry. We contribute to the literature by exploiting panel data on 
individual workers in an occupation where some but not all of the contracts on offer 
switched from very short-term contracts to salaried contracts providing us with the basis 
for a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. We observe workers over time pre- and 
post- the switch in payment regime which means we can account for fixed unobservable 
worker attributes – such as ability – which may affect workers’ probability of being 
offered a salaried contract. Because we observe workers over time leaving and entering 
the profession we are also able to examine the extent to which any performance effects of 
a switch to salaried contracts is associated with worker selection as opposed to direct 
incentive effects. 
 
Our paper explores the effects of a switch away from match fees towards salaried 
contracts among football referees officiating at English Premier League games. We find 
that cards per game – our measure of referee performance - fell for salaried referees after 
2001, after controlling for confounding influences such as attendance, team standings, 2 
 
match score and season. The paper considers some possible reasons for this finding. 
Section 2 reviews the evidence relating to the performance effects of individual 
performance-related pay and salaries. Section 3 describes our institutional setting. Section 
4 presents a model of referee behaviour linking compensation schemes to referee 
performance. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents our estimation strategy. 
Section 7 presents results while Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Previous  Literature 
 
Performance-related-pay can improve worker performance through direct incentive 
effects as workers expend more effort creating the outputs that are rewarded through pay, 
and through worker sorting since more able workers have more to gain from a pay system 
which rewards them according to their performance (Lazear, 1986). Firm case studies 
show worker productivity rises with switches to piece rate payments with worker sorting 
effects often accounting for a sizeable part of the total impact. The productivity of 
window-screen fitters rose by 44 per cent when the company Safelite switched to piece 
rate payments, with worker sorting accounting for half the increase (Lazear, 2000). 
Shearer (2004) obtains similar results using an experimental design whereby tree planters 
were randomly allocated to a piece rate and fixed rate. Bandiera et al. (2005) show 
productivity of fruit pickers rises dramatically with a shift from individual incentive pay 
based on relative performance (fruit-pickers’ mean pay set ex ante for the field but 
divided up according to relative performance) to piece rate (pay per unit of output fixed 
ex ante that does not vary with co-worker performance). In a companion paper Bandiera 
et al. (2007) emphasise the role managerial performance bonuses can play in improving 
worker productivity, an effect that comes via managers focusing their efforts on the most 
able workers and in recruiting and retaining better workers. Two papers estimate the 
effects of a move from piece rate to salaries. Fernie and Metcalf (1999) found that horse 
jockeys who switched to a salary-like retainer performed more poorly than jockeys who 
continued to be paid a piece rate, although their comparison is based on a small sample 
size. Similarly, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) show labour productivity in a shoe 
manufacturer fell following a shift from piece rate to time rates.  
 
Despite these positive productivity findings, piece rate pay is in decline whereas 
performance-related pay more generally is on the rise (Lemieux and Parent, 2009). This 
is for a number of reasons. First, there is a growing realisation that workers paid by the 
piece will focus exclusively on those activities which trigger payments, often to the 
detriment of other activities which an employer might wish to encourage. This has led to 
the increased usage of subjective as opposed to objective assessments of worker 
performance by supervisors and management which allow the employer to make a more 
rounded appraisal of the worker’s achievements. Second, workers can “game” piece rate 
systems. For instance, they may collude in reducing effort during a period in which the 
piece rate is set, thus lowering the output thresholds needed to trigger additional 
payments. Third, since piece rates require the worker to share the risk of 
underperformance with the employer, the employer needs to pay a premium to encourage 
risk-averse workers to accept piece rate payments. Indeed, it is often unclear in empirical 3 
 
work how much of the performance enhancement attributed to the introduction of piece 
rate working is actually an income effect akin to an efficiency wage, rather than the 
linking of pay to performance per se. Fourth, the growth in team-based production has 
increased the popularity of group-based performance related pay (“gain-sharing”) and 
financial participation based on profit-sharing or share ownership (Pendleton et al., 
2009). Fifth, piece rate pay can entail increased costs such as additional worker 
compensation and monitoring which can more than offset productivity gains, resulting in 
lower profitability. This is precisely what Freeman and Kleiner (2005) found in their 
study. 
 
Most workers are on salaried contracts. They have their own incentive effects. As 
Prendergast notes (1999: 10), where a worker is paid a fixed salary in a given period 
“despite the fact that there is no immediate relation between pay and performance, he is 
likely to have incentives to exert effort because good performance will improve future 
contracts. Such reputational concerns imply that effort exertion can occur without explicit 
pay-for-performance contracts.” In long-term salary contracts, the benefits of good 
performance may come in the form of deferred payments or benefits, such as pensions. In 
shorter fixed-term salary contracts, the rewards to good performance may come in the 
form of contract renewal. Salaries also smooth income fluctuations for workers, offering 
income security which may be absent among those on shorter-term performance-oriented 
contracts. These incentives may be particularly powerful if salaried job slots are rationed, 
creating a tournament among competing workers for those salaried contracts. In such 
cases, one may anticipate more able workers competing for the salaried contracts.  
 
 
3. Institutional  Setting   
 
Prior to the 2001/02 season all football referees in England were paid a match fee as 
compensation for officiating (Rickman and Witt, 2008). The fee was a flat rate but was 
higher in the top league – the Premier League, which we will call “tier 1” - than the 
second league – known as the Championship, which we label “tier 2” games.
1 Since the 
2001/02 season referees officiating at tier 1 games were paid a salary in a contract which 
was renewable at the end of two seasons (more recently, the end of each season) and 
which also included the match fee for officiating at a game.  
 
Rickman and Witt say the motivation for salaried contracts paid to referees was the need 
for ‘a clearer regulatory regime, consistent training, development and monitoring 
regimes’ (2008: 299).
2 The Premier League had already established a monitoring system 
by which referees’ performances was assessed by peer review. But the League 
                                                 
1 Tier 3 games attracted a lower rate still and the system of rising match fees as League status increases 
remains in force today. 
2 A further argument in favour of salaried contracts for referees has surfaced in recent years with the growth 
of betting activity, especially via online sources. By raising the salaries of referees at the top level, any 
propensity they may have to become involved in match-fixing will be reduced as the expected gain from 
corrupt activity will be less and the incidence of match-fixing will be reduced (Forrest, McHale and 
McAuley, 2008).  4 
 
experienced large growth in revenues, fuelled by lucrative sales of broadcast rights, and 
greater media exposure, part of which focussed on key decisions made by referees in 
high-profile games. This encouraged the Premier League to offer salaried contracts to a 
Select List of referees. A company was set up (the Professional Game Match Officials 
Board, PGMOB) to provide match officials for all professional games played in the 
English Leagues (Premier League and Football League). The PGMOB is jointly funded 
by the English Football Association (the governing body of football in England), the 
Premier League and the Football League.  
 
Table 1, which uses the data described in Section Four, shows the numbers of referees 
officiating in the top two divisions in English League football since 1997/98. The total 
number of referees is roughly constant over the period at around 70. Of these, roughly 50 
officiated in any given season in tier 2 and around 20 officiated in tier 1. Since the 
1999/00 season those officiating in tier 1 also tended to officiate in tier 2. Prior to this 
those officiating tier 1 matches tended not to officiate at tier 2 matches. The final column 
shows the number on salaried contracts after 2001. Initially 24 contracts were awarded 
but in most seasons since then the number awarded has been closer to 20. 
 
Table 2 shows the mean numbers of games officiated by referees, by tier and after 2001 
by contract type. Match fee referees average 8-9 games per season. In the first years of 
salaried contracts those on salaries tended to officiate at 16-18 tier 1 matches and 5-6 tier 
2 matches. But from around 2005/06 they were officiating at 20-22 tier 1 matches and 6-7 
tier 2 matches. Thus the total number of games that salaried referees officiated per season 
rose over the period. 
 
One institutional feature of top-level refereeing that persisted initially in spite of the 
introduction of salaried contracts was a compulsory retirement age of 48, with a small 
number of exceptions. A concern of the football authorities and other stakeholders in the 
game is that referees who are ‘too old’ may lack the physical fitness needed to keep with 
the fast flow of play in top-level professional football.
3 This age restriction has recently 
been abolished, in line with European Union law, although Select List referees must still 
pass rigorous fitness tests.  
 
As part of the professionalization of football refereeing the salaried contracts stipulated 
that the referee had to undertake off-the-job training on a regular basis to improve his or 
her skills in officiating at a football game. These fortnightly training sessions combine 
rigorous and specialist fitness training with reviews of previous performance using video 
playback. The training sessions are held at Premier League clubs so that, to some extent, 
                                                 
3 Older age might be associated with improved experience, better ‘reading’ of the game and with referees 
taking up better positions on the pitch so as to make good decisions. Weston et al (2010) analyzed a panel 
data set of Prozone statistics detailing aspects of physical performance by referees in Premier League 
games. They find that older referees (aged 43 to 48) had lower total distance covered, less average running 
distance at high intensity speed and fewer sprints compared to younger referees (aged 31 to 36). Although 
physical performance appeared to decline with age, the authors find that this did not impact upon the ability 
of older referees to keep up with play since average distance from location of fouls was not significantly 
different between the two age groups. This suggests that learning and experience are important features of 
top-level refereeing. 5 
 
referees actually train with players. This was intended to give referees greater insight into 
player (mis)behaviour and to facilitate better communication between referees and 
players. On the other hand, there is also scope for regulatory capture.  
 
The extra training sessions meant that salaried referees had longer hours than match fee 
referees who only needed to officiate on match day. Rickman and Witt (2008) report that 
in 2001/02, when salaried contracts were first introduced, salaried referees received an 
annual retainer fee of £33,000 per annum.
4 From 2001/02 they also received a match fee 
of £600 per game (Sawdon-Smith, 2001). The figure of £600 was actually a reduction 
from £900 in the previous season.
5 By 2008/09, the basic annual salary figure of £57,000 
(James, 2008). In most cases this meant that salaried referees could focus on refereeing as 
their primary occupation without having to rely on second jobs to supplement their 
income. Indeed, in 2001/02, there was only one referee who rejected the offer of a 
salaried contract in order to retain his regular job.
6  
 
Table 3 reports estimates of contracted referee salaries and Tier 1 match fees, obtained 
from newspaper sources. It is clear that, in both nominal and real terms, salaries for 
referees appointed to the Select List have grown considerably since 2001/02.
7 For 
2005/06, salaries were £50,000 and the Tier 1 match fee was reported to be £230. Using 
the mean games from Table 2, this implies an annual gross income of £55,276. This 
compares with the non-contract average of £2,739. For salaried referees in 2008, an 
annual retainer of £57,000 plus match fee of £375 (multiplied by mean number of tier 1 
games of 20) yielded £64,500. These referees also officiated an average of 6.17 games in 
tier 2 (at £145) giving an additional £895. This suggests an estimated annual gross 
income of £65,395 on average.
8 Non-contract referees in the same season would have 
received 8.65 x £145 = £1,254 on average, a gap of £64,141. Note that the match fee for 
non-contract referees has gone down between these years. The earnings gap between 
contracted and non-contract referees is widening over time if the sources of revenue are 
limited to tiers 1 and 2. Non-contract referees will also earn money from officiating in 
tiers 3 and 4 but the earnings gap with ‘professional’ referees remains substantial and 
increasing over time.  
                                                 
4 The football authorities were able to afford this because the contracts were introduced at a time when 
more money was flowing into the game from lucrative television rights (Dobson and Goddard, 2001). 
5 The figures of £600 and £900 included expenses for travel, accommodation and subsistence. After 2001, 
these expenses were awarded separately on top of a lower match fee. This accounts for the lower match 
fees reported in Table 3 after 2001. 
6 This was David Elleray who retained his position as house master at Harrow School but continued to 
referee Premier League games, paid by match fee alone. To be able to do this he had to gain special 
dispensation from the PGMOB to be excused from attending prescribed training and development sessions. 
Other referees took up jobs, such as taxi driving, with flexible hours that could be accommodated around a 
busy schedule of games during the football season (Sawdon-Smith, 2001). Self-employment remains an 
option for salaried referees.   
7 This has led to complaints by referees’ assistants (formerly linesmen) and some Football League referees 
not on the select list that their match fees have not risen in line with contracted referee salaries. These 
complaints have not been upheld by the PGMOB. 
See www.guardian.co,uk/football/2008/aug/14/premierleague1. 
8 This does not include income from Cup games, many of which are officiated by salaried referees in the 
final stages. 6 
 
In England, poorly performing referees on retainer can be, and sometimes are, demoted to 
lower status Football League games. When select contracts were first introduced in 
England in 2001/02, the duration of contract was fixed at two years but from 2003/04 
select referees were awarded one year rolling contracts, making it easier for the PGMOB 
to fire poorly performing referees and promote promising referees from the National List.  
 
This discussion suggests there are at least four mechanisms by which salaried contracts 
might have elicited improved referees’ performance relative to the match fee system: the 
incentive effects arising from career concerns; the efficiency wage effect associated with 
higher wages; the ‘quality’ effect associated with off-the-job referee training; and worker 
sorting leading to better workers obtaining salaried contracts. If salaried contracts were 
superior to match fee contracts, one might expect more able referees to queue for the 
relatively small number of core contracts offered by the football authorities. Since there 
are normally ten tier 1 games to officiate each weekend there appear to be sufficient 
salaried referees to undertake the task throughout the period. However, the number of 
salaried contracts gradually fell throughout the period from 24 in 2001/02 to 19 in 
2008/09 (Table 1), implying increasing competition for these slots.  
 
All tier 1 games were officiated by referees on salaried contracts after 2001/02 with a few 
exceptions which are discussed below. Referees not on a salaried contract continued to be 
paid on a per match basis after 2001. However, all of them were eligible in principle for 
salaried contracts, if they were promoted to tier 1 games. Thus the competition for 
salaried posts is akin to a tournament and may have generated improved performance 
among both salaried and non-salaried workers keen to obtain a salaried position in the 
following season. In Section 6 below we explain how we exploit this natural experiment 
to investigate whether salaried referees performed better than those on match fees. 
 
As discussed in Section 4, refereeing is a complex activity requiring the worker to 
perform multiple tasks which is why referees are assessed by the football authorities 
using subjective assessments by expert observers. A good referee is one that keeps the 
flow of the game going and ensures that fair play is enforced. Good refereeing relies on 
having experience, the right temperament, fitness and the ability to work in a team with 
the other officials (two assistant referees, one on each touchline, and the fourth official 
who assists with matters such as ensuring managers stay within their designated areas). 
Referees’ performances are carefully scrutinised by paying fans and by the media who, 
with the benefit of instant television replays relayed around the ground, can assess 
whether key decisions were correct or not. A considerable body of literature finds 
evidence that referees’ decisions are influenced by the social pressures fans exert.
9 We 
                                                 
9 See Garicano, Palacios-Huerta and Prendergast (2005), Rickman and Witt (2008) and Dohmen (2008) on 
bias towards home teams in the form of time added on at the end of games at the referee’s discretion. 
Dawson et al. (2007) and Buraimo, Forrest and Simmons (2010) present evidence of bias towards home 
teams and against away teams in the award of sanctions (yellow and red cards). Dohmen (2008) suggests 
that referee decisions such as penalty awards may also contain non-random mistakes. This evidence covers 
a number of dimensions of referee decision-making across several professional football Leagues, 
principally England, Germany and Spain, and points towards systematic biases in referee behaviour. 
Rickman and Witt (2008) present evidence to show that biases associated with discretionary time added on 
by referees were eliminated after salaried contracts were introduced to the English Premier League. 7 
 
are able to account for this with controls for game characteristics including matches 
between local rivals and crowd size. The fact that referees’ performances are readily 
evaluated by fans, the media and the football authorities means that the cost of a poor 
performance to a referee is likely to be substantial and immediate. Those on a match fee 
may find they are not selected for next week’s match while those on a salary will suffer a 
blow to their reputation and may find it harder to have their salary contract renewed in 
the next season. A further implication is that there is limited room for referees to “game” 
the system of incentives they are working under: the efforts (whether they keep up with 
the play, ,make the right decisions, keep the game flowing and keep the players under 
control) are observable to some extent. Nevertheless, there is enough discretion available 
to referees in their interpretations of the Laws of the Game to mean that principal-agent 
problems cannot be ruled out (Rickman and Witt, 2008).  
 
 
4.  A Model of Referee Behaviour 
 
Let the production of value from refereeing be V = f(C, P). C is effort devoted to card 
giving which we shall term ‘deterministic’ effort while P is preventive effort. We assume 
that fC > 0, fP > 0, fCC < 0, fPP < 0, fCP > 0 and fCCfPP > fCP
2 for concavity of the value 
function. The cost of effort to the referee is X = g(C, P) where gC > 0, gP > 0, gCC > 0, gPP 
> 0, gCP > 0 and gCCgPP > gCP
2 for convexity. P and C are substitutes in the production of 
value and in the referee's cost function. Suppose the referee receives a fixed salary that is 
not conditional on effort, that C is observable and verifiable and that P is exogenous then 
a single League’s surplus is: 
 
 V – W – X where W is a fixed fee paid to referees.          (1) 
 
Assume that the League can determine C while P is exogenous. C is given by the number 
of cards awarded by referees. The League planner maximises its surplus by varying C. 
 
  fC - gC  =   0           ( 2 )  
 
and the second order condition for a maximum surplus is fCC – gCC < 0 which follows 
directly from the concavity and convexity conditions stated above. If P  varies 
exogenously, what is the first-best optimal response of C for the League planner? 
Implicit differentiation of (1) and using the 1
st order condition (2) gives: 
 
dC/dP = (fCP – gCP)/ (gCC – fCC)         ( 3 )  
 
dC/dP < 0 follows if gCP > fCP so the impact of an extra unit of P on the marginal value 
product of sanctions is less than the corresponding impact on the marginal cost of effort 
with respect to card giving. Hence, under these assumptions, there is an inverse 
relationship between P and C at the optimum. If P rises then C must fall to preserve and 
optimum level of surplus for the League planner. 
 8 
 
Now suppose both C and P are variable. Let φ be a weight on P in the value function so 
this becomes f(C, φP). Then in the first-best solution: 
 
fC - gC = 0   
φfP - gP  =   0            ( 4 )  
 
Suppose the weight on P in the value function increases for some reason. Then 
comparative static analysis shows that dC/dφ < 0 and dP/dφ > 0. C declines and P goes 
up.  
 
A greater weight on P in the value function is precisely what has occurred in the English 
Premier League (tier 1) since its inception in 1992. The increased rewards at the top level 
of English football, stimulated by enhanced revenues from broadcast rights, have 
encouraged greater athleticism and faster speed amongst the players appearing at this 
level. As the game has become faster, the marginal product of P in the production 





1/σ where 0 < σ ≤  1 .          ( 5 )  
 
The log of the marginal rate of transformation between P and C is given by: 
 
Ln MRTC,P = σln(AP/AC) + (1 – σ)ln(C/P)       (6) 
 
The increased weight on P in the production of value leads to an increase in the relative 
demand for this component of referee activity in a way that is analogous to the increased 
demand for skilled labour due to skill-biased technological change.  
 
Referees perform two ‘tasks’ (card-giving and preventive effort) but there is just one 
source of reward that is contingent on the two efforts associated with these tasks. It is not 
possible for the principal to offer separate rewards for distinct tasks and, even if it was 
possible, P is difficult for the principal to observe while C, although easier to observe, is 
a noisy measure of sanctioning effort since the card-giving process is partly driven by a 
stochastic process which depends on factors such as the good behaviour of players. If this 
was not the case, the employer could simply make pay contingent on observed effort. 
Even if cards were a suitable measure of effort devoted to sanctions, a contract based 
purely on card-giving would fail to consider the impact of discretionary effort on value. 
Thus the League needs to avoid a corner solution where referees only devote effort to 
cards and perform zero preventive effort. A corner solution is ruled out by the assumption 
of different productivities of the two types of effort. A corner solution is optimal if card 
giving is less costly to the referee at the margin than preventive effort but the marginal 
products of each type of effort are equal or the marginal product of card giving is greater 
than the marginal product of discretionary effort. From (4) if gP > gC then at the first-best 
optimum it must follow that the marginal value product of discretionary effort φfP is 
greater than fC for the optimum to be at an interior solution. 
 9 
 
Efforts are not easily observable but assume combined effort has a performance metric 
attached to it, which we denote by x. This performance metric is observed by the 
governing body but is not verifiable. In the empirical analysis below, we proxy the non-
revealed (to the econometrician) values of x by performance ratings taken from 
newspaper match reports. The efforts in each of the two tasks determine performance as 
follows: 
 
Pr (x =1|e) = ηC + P + ε         ( 7 )  
 
where η > 1 and ε is an i.i.d error term which partly reflects the stochastic elements in 
card-giving. 
10Our framework is one where refereeing ‘output’ (performance) is 
observable but stochastic. The principal sees if a referee’s performance is good but 
cannot tell whether this is due to spontaneous good behaviour of the players or to good 
refereeing. Similarly, card giving is a noisy measure of effort, C, as sanctions will result 
from both the spontaneous misbehaviour of players and poor control of the game by a 
referee. For this reason, we do not observe card-contingent contracts. 
 
 The parameter η in (7) illustrates the multi-tasking problem in our model. If η > 1, a 
referee who is rewarded on the basis of x has incentives to substitute away from P and 
devote more effort to C. Note that this substitution would occur even if each type of 
effort had the same marginal effect on the referee’s cost of effort and the same marginal 
effect on the League’s value. The substitutability of efforts in the referee’s cost function 
merely reinforces the result that holds with an additively separable effort function. 
Moreover, the multi-tasking problem is exacerbated if the two types of effort are 
substitutes in the production function with differences in their marginal products.
11  
 
Since performance in each job (League) is non-verifiable, the League can only offer an 
implicit contract promising a bonus payment if referee performance is found to be good. 
The contract offered to referee A is a pair (W, B) where W is a lump sum wage and B is an 
implicitly contracted bonus payment offered only if performance is good, that is, x = 1. 
We can relate these payments to what we actually observe in the world of football 
refereeing as follows. In a given season there are n games to be refereed in the League. 
There are fewer qualified referees available, N, than total games to be refereed so some 
rationing must occur. If we assume identical referees, then each referee will officiate n/N 
games. Suppose the League governing body offers a per game fee of F for League games 
then the fixed payment for a typical referee in each League will be Fn/N. The bonus B 
can take two forms. First, it can entail a redistribution of games such that a referee 
posting good performance is assigned to more games than one who delivers poor 
performance so referees do not officiate equal numbers of games. Second, the principal 
can reward good performance by an increment to the expected payment from a given 
number of games. Both of these features are observed in practice. The crucial points 
                                                 
10 Our analysis of optimal referee contracts follows Corts (2007) and Mukherjee and Vasconcelos 
(forthcoming), who develop models of optimal job design with implicit incentive contracts. 
11 This problem, sometimes referred to as "teaching to the test", is discussed by Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991: 32-33) and Lazear (2006). 10 
 
about this bonus are first, that it is promised, and second, that the promise is contingent 
on satisfactory effort. 
 
The annual salary, as opposed to a per-match fee, creates career concerns for selected 
referees but the credibility condition requires that the total remuneration to these referees 
should increase.  
 
The League also instituted a two-tier structure for referee remuneration. In the top tier, 
the Premier League, there was a salary per annum. In the second tier, the Football 
League, referees were compensated by a basic fee per game. The expected annual 
remuneration for refereeing in the Premier League was greater than for the Football 
League. For Premier League referees this means that the outside option increased to 
being the expected earnings from an alternative occupation plus earnings from refereeing 
in the Football League. This in turn raised the opportunity cost of a bad performance for 
Premier League referees.  
 
Although credibility may be satisfied (in the sense that the League does not renege on its 
promised bonus), the incentive compatibility condition- for optimal referees’ effort 
choices to be interior solutions- may still not be satisfied. Returning to (7), the League 
may assess referee performance with a new weight of η < 1 so as to reflect the increased 
weight of preventive effort in the value function. Referees then have an incentive to 
substitute preventive effort for card-giving effort. With η  < 1, however, incentive 
compatibility is violated by XP > XC in the cost of effort function, which is the assumption 
we made at the beginning of this section. To see this point, consider the payoffs of a 
representative referee defined as: 
 
U = W + B Pr (x =1| e) – X(C, P)        (8) 
 
The outside option of the referee is assumed to be zero. The incentive compatibility 
constraint requires maximisation of the referee’s net payoff to yield the first-order 
conditions:  
 
Bη – XP = 0 and  
B- XC  =   0 .              ( 9 )  
 
Hence, if η > 1 then XP must exceed XC for the incentive compatibility conditions to hold. 
Conversely, if XP does exceed XC, as we propose was actually the case, then η < 1 will 
violate the incentive compatibility conditions.  
 
The League offered a rational response to this incentive compatibility problem: by 
offering, indeed making compulsory, appropriate training and educational support to 
referees involving more extensive performance reviews and better communication with 
teams and players prior to match day, the League was able to help referees reduce the 
marginal cost of preventive effort to the referee relative to the less variable marginal cost 11 
 
of card-giving.
12 However, this off-the-job training and education process requires 
additional effort on the part of a referee and the salary payment, made conditional on 
undertaking training and educational development, is needed to sustain incentives to 





There were 11,184 tier 1 and tier 2 league games played in England in twelve seasons 
between 1997/98 and 2008/09. We have referee information on all but 15 of these games. 
Forty-one per cent of the games in our data are tier 1 games. Salaried contracts were 
introduced in the 2001/02 season for referees officiating in tier 1 games. Across the 
whole period, two-thirds of tier 1 games are officiated by salaried referees. 
 
All tier 1 games were officiated by referees on salaried contracts after 2001/02 with a few 
exceptions which are discussed below. However, some of those with salaried contracts 
officiated in tier 2 games after 2001/02: these matches accounted for 15 per cent of all 
tier 2 games. 
 
We know the identity of all 168 referees who officiated in these games and this 
represents the whole population of referees. Of these referees, nine only ever officiated in 
tier 1 games, 114 only ever officiated in tier 2 games and the remaining 45 officiated in 
both tier 1 and tier 2 games. The fact that we find a sizeable percentage of referees who 
officiate at both levels indicates that the referees’ labour market is not segmented by tier, 
thus lending credence to our suggestion that all referees employed at the time salaried 
contracts were introduced could, in principle, be eligible for such a contract.  
 
At the referee level we have an unbalanced panel. They officiate at between one and 312 
games, the mean being 66 games. Sixty-nine referees are observed in the period before 
and after the introduction of salaried contracts, including 37 referees who had a salaried 
contract at some point after 2001/02. 
 
We measure performance with the number of yellow and red cards referees issue in a 
game. Yellow cards are issued as a warning to a player when he has broken the rules, 
either by fouling an opponent, handling the ball or for showing dissent. A red card is 
shown if the player commits a second offence worthy of a yellow card. It can also be 
shown for a first offence if the offence merits it, such as violent conduct or in the case of 
a foul which directly prevents a goal scoring opportunity. Red cards lead to the player 
being sent off and suspended from subsequent games. Issuing many cards is often a sign 
that a referee has lost control of a game. Good referees are able to deal with most 
incidents without brandishing cards by communicating firmly with players from the 
outset. Indeed, it appears that the Premier League saw improved communication between 
referees and players as an important outcome of the conditions of salaried contracts.  
                                                 
12 Training and development programmes can lower marginal costs of each type of effort, but we contend 
that the marginal cost of preventive effort fell by more than the marginal cost of effort devoted to sanctions 
when these programmes were introduced by the referees’ employer. 12 
 
Ideally, we would observe overall referee effort. We would like to use peer reviews of 
referees undertaken by the referees’ employer but these are proprietary. The closest 
indicator one can obtain is subjective assessments of referee performance by one 
newspaper, The Times.
13 Another study from Germany has shown a high negative 
correlation between number of cards awarded and magazine assessments (Frick et al 
2008). We have coded referee ratings on 1,305 games in our data set for three seasons 
(2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4) for which ratings were published. Because we have no 
ratings for the period prior to the introduction of salaries we are unable to use the ratings 
to estimate the impact of salaries on referee performance. However, we are able to use 
the data to establish whether card giving is negatively correlated with referee ratings, as 
our theoretical model predicts. Multivariate analyses controlling for season dummies and 
referee fixed effects confirm that giving yellow and red cards is strongly negatively 
correlated with referee ratings.
14 
 
We will present several covariates as controls including a time trend, dummy variable for 
tier 1, match attendance, score difference between teams in a game, dummy variable for 
games involving local rivals, months left until the end of the season and the points the 
home and away teams had won up until the start of the game. The match-level means and 





The model presented in Section 4 showed that preventive effort is more productive for 
the employer than sanctioning effort (see equation 4). We argued that the shift towards 
salaries, together with the attendant increased emphasis on training and development, 
would induce referees to focus more on preventive effort at the expense of sanctioning 
effort. Thus we anticipate card giving - the only measure of effort we have available for 
the pre- and post-periods - to fall with the switch to salaries. Our model of total yellow 
cards given in a particular match is: 
 
Y = CONSTANT + β1TIME +β2TIER 1 + β3(TIER 1×POST01/02) + β4LOGATTEND + 
β5SCORE + β6SCORESQ + β7DERBY + β8MONTHSTOGO + β9HOMEPOINTS + 
β10AWAYPOINTS + ε   (10) 
 
A similar model is estimated for total second yellow and straight red cards in a given 
match (R). We use a difference-in-difference estimator to identify whether the 
introduction of salaried contracts affected referee performance. Our unit of analysis is the 
football match and our dependent variable (our performance measure) is the number of 
cards the referee awards during the game. First we run an OLS model which includes a 
                                                 
13 Inspection of the content of match reports associated with the publication of referee ratings and 
conversations with referee peer assessors suggest to us that the criteria for good and bad performances of 
referees are consistent between journalists and assessors. Features such as allowing the game to flow, 
getting key decisions right and generally showing good control without being overly intrusive are 
indicative of good performances as judged by both assessors and journalists. 
14 Full analyses are available from the authors on request. 13 
 
linear term capturing time (TIME), a dummy variable for a tier 1 match (TIER 1) and an 
interaction between TIER 1 and a dummy variable for the period from 2001/02 onwards 
which captures the introduction of salary contracts for referees officiating in tier 1 games 
(β3(TIER 1×POST01/02)). We run this model without controls and then test the 
sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of the controls described below.
15 In an 
alternative specification we replace the linear time trend with year dummies to capture 
potential non-linear time effects on referees’ performances. The year dummies are jointly 
significant and the model performs a little better than the one using a linear time trend so 
we report results with the year dummies. 
 
The identifying assumption in these models is that the interaction between tier 1 games 
and the period after the introduction of salary contracts will capture the causal impact of 
salary contracts on referee performance. The assumption is that any significant 
interaction effect reflects the introduction o f  s a l a r y  c o n t r a c t s ,  rather than other 
contemporaneous changes which might have differentially affected tier 1 referees relative 
to tier 2 referees. At this stage, we have 11,169 games for analysis. 
 
The control variables help account for the fact that referee allocation to games may be 
non-random. It seems probable that those referees assessed as good by the football 
authorities are more likely to be appointed to officiate high-profile games than referees 
assessed as performing more poorly. Since high-profile games also have the potential to 
be more heated and thus more difficult to officiate, it is conceivable that some referees 
will be confronted with a more challenging set of match assignments than others, 
something which could bias the estimates of salary contracts on referee performance. We 
control for differences in the difficulty attached to particular match assignments with a 
range of match-level controls such as (log) attendance (LOGATTEND), a dummy variable 
for whether the game is a derby game between two nearby rivals (DERBY), and the 
league positions of the clubs playing the match, expressed as accumulated points per 
game at the time of the match, assessed separately for home and away teams 
(HOMEPOINTS,  AWAYPOINTS). The number of cards awarded may depend on the 
closeness of game as captured by SCORE which is the goal difference between home and 
away teams in a given match and its square SCORESQ.  This measure was used by 
Rickman and Witt (2008) in their study of the impact of salaried contracts on 
discretionary time added on by referees. The need to allow sufficient games in the early 
part of a season to pass so as to accumulate sufficient information for HOMEPOINTS and 
AWAYPOINTS means that at this stage our sample size drops slightly, from 11,169 to 
10,904. 
 
The football authorities may be more constrained in being able to appoint a salaried 
referee to a tier 1 game in some years relative to others due to fluctuations in the number 
of salaried referee contracts in place. We therefore tested the sensitivity of our results to 
the introduction of this as a control variable. This made no difference to our key results 
so it is dropped from the models presented here. 
                                                 
15 It might be argued that number of cards is a count variable and so a Poisson regression estimator is 
appropriate. All models were estimated using Poisson regression and each model delivered similar 
qualitative results to OLS. We report OLS results for greater ease of interpretation. 14 
 
One potential threat to this identification strategy is the likely non-random allocation of 
salary contracts to referees. It is probable that the football authorities offer salary 
contracts to the most talented referees who they choose from the queue of referees keen 
to make refereeing their sole or main occupation. If so, then being on a salaried contract 
may simply proxy referees’ talent. Comparing the Tier 1 match experience, as total 
games and average per season, for referees who made it to the Select List compared to 
those who were eligible but not appointed, we find that those referees who were 
appointed to the Select List had greater experience than those who were not appointed. 
This suggests that appointment to salaried contract status was primarily determined by 
human capital (experience) considerations.
16 To tackle the selection issue in our match-
level analyses we introduce referee fixed effects to our difference-in-difference estimator. 
These fixed effects control for fixed referee attributes such as talent. With their 
introduction the interaction effect captures the impact of the switch to salary contracts net 
of any pre-existing talent differential between salaried and non-salaried referees. 
 
A further threat to our identification strategy is the unbalanced nature of our panel which 
reflects referee entry and exits. Referees’ decisions as to whether to enter the profession 
or quit may, in part, be associated with the advent of salaried contracts. Indeed, as our 
earlier discussion indicated, employers often deploy what they hope might be better 
contracts in the hope that it induces worker sorting which is productivity-enhancing. We 
can establish how sensitive our results are to worker sorting by varying our estimation 
sample. Estimates run on games officiated by referees who contribute observations for 
the period prior to the introduction of salary contracts and the period after their 
introduction limits the impact referee sorting can have on the results. A comparison 
between these estimates and estimates using all observations in the sample will establish 
just how important worker sorting is in explaining any role played by salaried contracts. 
Models containing only those games officiated by referees contributing observations 
before and after the introduction of salaried contracts are likely to give us the cleanest 
estimate of the direct career incentive effects of salary contracts. 
 
All the above analyses are conducted on different measures of the propensity to give 
yellow and red cards to see how robust the estimates are. We are still left with three 
possible direct incentive effects of salaried contracts: the income effect; the “pure” career 
concerns effect; and the off-the-job training effect. We explore the timing of effects in the 





                                                 
16 A probit analysis of selection into salaried contract from the pool of eligible referees in 2001/02 supports 
this argument. The explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation which capture being a good 
referee – such as refereeing ‘big’ games and the number of cards shown to players - are all lagged variables 
measured in the period prior to the introduction of salary contracts in tier 1. The coefficients on these 
variables are jointly insignificant, leaving just tier 1 match experience with the solitary significant 
coefficient. Of course, peer review of refereeing performances occurred before the advent of salaried 
contracts and we would expect the best referees to have the greatest top-level experience and then to go on 




Our results are match-level estimates of referee performance where the dependent 
variable is the number of cards given during the match. Table 1 shows only modest 
variation in the number of salaried contracts awarded in a season and not surprisingly the 
coefficient of NCONTRACTS was not significantly different from zero throughout. We 
therefore drop this variable from the reported estimates.  
 
Table 5 presents estimates for the number of first yellow cards given per match for the 
whole period. We present models with year dummies: these are jointly statistically 
significant whereas the linear time trend does not have a significant coefficient. The 
interaction term for tier 1 matches and the period since the introduction of salaried 
contracts is negative and statistically significant in the OLS models in columns 1 and 2, 
indicating that the number of first yellow cards given fell by around a half a card per 
game with the shift to salaried contracts. The size of the effect only drops a little with the 
introduction of controls in model 2.  
 
These control variables perform as anticipated. The number of cards shown is 
significantly higher in ‘big’ games, that is, those with high attendances and derby games 
between local rivals. However, if there is a large score discrepancy in the game – that is, 
the game proves not to be particularly competitive – this results in fewer cards being 
shown. This effect is non-linear, growing with larger score discrepancies. The number of 
cards is greater earlier on in the season, a finding that is consistent with players being 
more cautious towards the end of the season to ensure they are available for selection in 
important games. It is also consistent with the proposition that referees exert greater 
effort towards the end of the season, thus producing fewer cards, in the hope that this may 
increase their chances of having their salaried contract renewed or being offered one for 
the first time. Team performance prior to the game also proves to be a significant factor. 
Where the home team has a high points tally prior to the game the number of cards 
shown during the game is lower, perhaps suggesting that successful home teams need not 
resort to foul play in order to win. In contrast, a successful away team with a high points 
tally prior to the game is associated with more yellow cards being shown as one might 
expect if successful teams resort to tougher tactics away from home, or else elicit a more 
robust competitive spirit from home teams leading to more foul play.  
 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 are identical to the first and second columns but 
the models now include referee fixed effects which account for fixed unobservable 
characteristics of referees, such as their innate talent. These models account for more of 
the variance in card giving than the OLS models. If the fixed talent of those who become 
salaried referees was driving the effects of salaried contracts we would expect to see a 
substantial reduction in the size of the coefficient on the interaction term. In fact, 
although it falls a little it remains large and statistically significant indicating that the 
non-random allocation of salary contracts to more able referees is not driving the 
results.
17 As we noted earlier, some tier 1 matches played after the introduction of 
                                                 
17 Our identification strategy assumes that the growth in the performance gap we attribute to the 
introduction of salaries is driven by an improvement in the performance of tier 1 referees, rather than a 16 
 
salaried contracts were not officiated by salaried referees. The exclusion of these games 
from the estimation makes very little difference to the results. Similarly, the exclusion of 
the tier 2 games that were refereed by salaried referees does not affect the results.
18 
 
Table 6 performs the same analyses but this time the estimates relate to all cards given 
during games, including second yellow cards and red cards. The pattern of results is very 
similar. Indeed, the impact of the introduction of salaried contracts appears a little 
stronger. Once again, the results are not sensitive to the exclusion of games where a tier 1 
game was officiated by a non-salaried referee after 2000/01 or those tier 2 games which 
were officiated by salaried referees.  
 
Table 7 replicates the analysis presented in Table 6, but the sample of matches is 
confined to those officiated by referees who are observed both before and after the 
introduction of salaried contracts. This accounts for the reduction in the sample size. The 
OLS coefficients are around three-quarters the size of those presented in Table 6, 
suggesting that worker sorting accounts for at least some of the performance impact 
associated with the introduction of salaried contracts. However, the coefficients from the 
referee fixed effects models in columns 3 and 4 are virtually identical to those presented 
in Table 6. Taken together these results suggest that, while some of the impact of salaried 
contracts on referee performance stems from the non-random assignment of contracts to 
the more talented referees, movement of referees into and out of the profession appears to 
have had little additional impact on referee performance.
19  
 
The size of the performance gap between referees on salaried contracts and those on 
match fees is potentially informative with respect to the different mechanisms by which 
the salary effect occurs. We therefore reran estimates similar to those presented in Table 
6 replacing the interaction between tier 1 and the post-2000/01 dummy with an 
interaction between tier 1 and the years since 2000/01 (running from zero in 2000/01 to 8 
in 2008/09). The interactions are jointly statistically significant. The coefficients grow in 
size over the first few years of salaried contracts but then stabilise until the last two years 
we observe where the interaction effects fall in size and become statistically non-
significant.
20 Clearly, the salaried contracts had an immediate and substantial impact but 
this was not sustained throughout the period. There are a number of possible ways to 
interpret this result. First, initial competition for salaried contracts was akin to a 
‘competitive shock’ the effects of which were felt early on but dissipated over time once 
some referees proved successful in obtaining those job slots. Second, and alternatively, 
non-salaried referees may have begun to improve their relative performance in the hope 
                                                                                                                                                 
decline in the performance of tier 2 referees. Following a suggestion by an anonymous referee we ran 
before-after estimates on tier 1 referees only. These models, which are available from the authors on 
request, confirm a strong statistically significant decline in card giving by tier 1 referees post the 
introduction of salaries having controlled for referee fixed effects and other controls already mentioned. 
18 These sensitivity tests are available from the authors on request. 
19 The same conclusions emerge when we run this analysis for first yellow cards only. Once again, the 
results are not sensitive to the removal of tier 1 games officiated by a non-salaried referee after 2000/01 nor 
those tier 2 games which were officiated by salaried referees.  
20 These results are available from the authors on request. 17 
 
of becoming salaried referees.
21 Either way, it appears that any impact associated with the 
new training regime has not been sustained over time. Nor have the increased real income 
returns to salaried contracts incentivized salaried referees to exert still more effort relative 
to their piece rate counterparts in order to retain those contracts. 
 
 
8.   Conclusions 
 
Using data on referees in the top two divisions of English football we show that the 
introduction  of salaried contracts for those in the top division resulted in improved 
referee performance, as measured by the number of cards referees give each game. Our 
difference-in-difference estimator isolates the effect of the switch to salary contracts 
having accounted for trends common to salaried and non-salaried referees which may 
have influenced their performance. We account for fixed unobservable differences across 
referees, such as natural talent, using referee fixed effects. The fixed effects estimates 
show that some of the effect is due to the non-random allocation of salaried contracts to 
more talented referees. However, although the effect attributable to salaried contracts 
falls a little it remains strong and statistically significant. Furthermore, worker sorting in 
and out of refereeing in tiers 1 and 2 over the period makes little difference to the impact 
of salaries on performance. 
 
Our result indicates that worker performance improves when workers are paid a salary as 
opposed to a short-term contract. This is because, in the case of football referees, the 
introduction of salaried contracts was part of the ‘professionalization’ of the occupation. 
This has two clear performance-enhancing effects. The first is a worker sorting effect, 
with more ambitious and, potentially, more talented referees, seeking to enter and remain 
in the profession. This accounted for some of the effect we find. The second effect is the 
‘career concerns’ effect associated with the desire to perform well today in the hope of 
securing or retaining a salaried position in the future. This second effect is closely 
associated with the much higher income one can command as a salaried referee compared 
to a referee operating on a match-based piece rate. The moment salaries were introduced 
in 2001/02 those on salaried contracts were able to earn vastly more through refereeing 
than would have been the case if they continued to work on a match fee basis. The real 
income gap grew over time with the appreciation of the value of salaried contracts 
relative to piece rate payments. Thus the threat of not having one’s salary contract 
renewed was considerable, no doubt leading referees to exert greater efforts to perform 
well and thus merit contract renewal. 
 
The other reason why one might have seen improved performance among salaried 
referees relative to those on a match fee is that salary contracts required referees to 
undergo rigorous off-the-job training to improve their performance. Empirically, it is 
difficult to distinguish between the career concerns, income effects and training effects 
on referee performance. However, tests of the differential impact of salary contracts on 
performance over time indicate that their introduction had an immediate and substantial 
                                                 
21 Before-after estimates for tier 2 referees only indicate no clear pattern in card giving in the year 
dummies, suggesting that tier 2 referees were not improving their performance relative to the pre-period. 18 
 
impact on performance. This effect remained statistically significant until around 
2006/07, a finding consistent with a ‘one-off’ albeit fairly sustained effect associated with 
professionalization, one which is unlikely to improve further by paying salaried referees 
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Table 1: Number of referees who officiated in both pre- and contract periods  
Season  Tier 1 only  Tier 2 only  Tiers 1 and 2  All referees 
Referees on 
salaried contracts 
1997-98 19  49  0  68  0 
1998-99 17  53  1  71  0 
1999-00  0 50 21 71  0 
2000-01  3 52 23 78  0 
2001-02  1 51 24 76 24 
2002-03  1 51 22 74 25 
2003-04  1 55 21 77 21 
2004-05  0 50 23 73 19 
2005-06  0 40 22 62 16 
2006-07  0 47 20 67 17 
2007-08  0 49 18 67 18 
2008-09  1 51 18 70 19 
 
 
Table 2: Mean number of games per season by tier and type of contract 
Tier 1  Tier 2 
Season  Contract Non-contract Contract Non-contract 
1997-98 20.00  10.98 
1998-99 21.11  10.22 
1999-00 18.10  7.76 
2000-01 14.62  7.36 
2001-02 15.79  1.00  6.58  7.73 
2002-03 16.52  0.00  5.88  8.39 
2003-04 18.05  1.00  5.52  7.93 
2004-05 19.42  2.75  5.00  8.46 
2005-06 22.94  2.17  6.50  9.74 
2006-07 22.06  1.67  7.12  8.62 
2007-08 21.11  0.00  7.33  8.57 
2008-09 20.00  0.00  6.17  8.65 
 
 
Table 3: Salaries and Tier 1 match fees for referees after 2001 
Season Salary  Match  fee 
2001/02 33,000  600 
2005/06 50,000  230 
2007/08 53,000  270 
2008/09 57,000  350 
Sources: Sawdon-Smith (2001) for 2001/02 
www.Independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/what-britain-earns-509669.html for 2005/06 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/premier_league/article2296121.ece for 2007/08 
www.guardian.co,uk/football/2008/aug/14/premierleague1 for 2008/09 
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Table 4: Summary statistics 
Panel A: All games  N  Mean  s.d  Min  Max 
Yellow cards per game  10904 2.977  1.915  0 12 
Second yellow and red cards per game  10904 0.174  0.441  0  4 
TIER 1  10904 0.407  0.491  0  1 
POST00/01  10904 0.668  0.471  0  1 
TIER 1 × POST00/01  10904 0.271  0.445  0  1 
Attendance  10904 23106.120  12808.830 849  76098 
SCORE  10904 0.389  1.650  -7  8 
SCORESQ  10904 2.874  4.765  0 64 
DERBY  10904 0.045  0.207  0  1 
MONTHSTOGO  10904 4.609  2.669  0  9 
HOMEPOINTS  10904 1.348  0.493  0  3 
AWAYPOINTS  10904 1.380  0.497  0  3 
Panel B: Games up to and including 2000/01 season           
Yellow cards per game  3625 2.963  1.985  0 12 
Second yellow and red cards per game  3625 0.164  0.444  0  3 
TIER 1  3625 0.408  0.492  0  1 
POST00/01  3625 0.000  0.000  0  0 
TIER 1 × POST00/01  3625 0.000  0.000  0  0 
Attendance  3625 21058.960  11974.820  3436  67637 
SCORE  3625 0.439  1.691  -7  8 
SCORESQ  3625 3.052  5.219  0 64 
DERBY  3625 0.047  0.212  0  1 
MONTHSTOGO  3625 4.568  2.712  0  9 
HOMEPOINTS  3625 1.350  0.488  0  3 
AWAYPOINTS  3625 1.378  0.493  0  3 
Panel C: Games after 2000/01 season           
Yellow cards per game  7279 2.984  1.879  0 12 
Second yellow and red cards per game  7279 0.180  0.440  0  4 
TIER 1  7279 0.407  0.491  0  1 
POST00/01  7279 1.000  0.000  1  1 
TIER 1 x POST00/01  7279 0.407  0.491  0  1 
ATTENDANCE  7279 24125.620  13086.410 849  76098 
SCORE  7279 0.364  1.629  -6  7 
SCORESQ  7279 2.786  4.519  0 49 
DERBY  7279 0.044  0.204  0  1 
MONTHSTOGO  7279 4.629  2.648  0  9 
HOMEPOINTS  7279 1.348  0.495  0  3 
AWAYPOINTS  7279 1.381  0.499  0  3 
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Table 5: OLS and referee fixed effects models for N first yellow cards per game 
VARIABLES OLS  OLS  FE  FE 
TIER 1  0.644*** 0.460*** 0.381*** 0.233** 
  (10.16) (6.25) (4.36) (2.49) 
POST00/01  0.305*** 0.226** -0.022  -0.027 
  (3.24) (2.39) (0.20) (0.27) 
TIER 1 × POST00/01  -0.554*** -0.510*** -0.483*** -0.427*** 
  (7.14) (6.56) (5.24) (4.63) 
LOGATTEND   0.220***   0.227*** 
   (4.82)   (5.07) 
SCORE   -0.024**   -0.019* 
   (2.01)   (1.68) 
SCORESQ   -0.029***   -0.028*** 
   (7.33)   (7.29) 
DERBY   0.716***   0.724*** 
   (8.17)   (8.44) 
MONTHSTOGO   0.067***   0.067*** 
   (9.95)    (10.21) 
HOMEPOINTS   -0.094**   -0.085** 
   (2.35)   (2.17) 
AWAYPOINTS  0.140*** 0.157*** 
   (3.81)   (4.36) 
CONSTANT  2.620*** 0.249  2.936*** 0.453 
  (38.55) (0.59)  (38.13) (1.09) 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  11169 10904 11169 10904 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 24 
 
Table 6: OLS and referee fixed effects models for the number of yellow and red 
cards per game 
VARIABLES OLS  OLS  FE  FE 
TIER 1  0.667*** 0.484*** 0.375*** 0.230** 
  (9.85) (6.16) (4.62) (2.29) 
POST00/01 0.345***  0.268***  -0.012  -0.142 
  (3.43) (2.64) (0.10) (1.18) 
TIER 1 × POST00/01  -0.594*** -0.553*** -0.524*** -0.469*** 
  (7.16) (6.64) (5.32) (4.75) 
LOGATTEND   0.219***   0.225*** 
   (4.49)   (4.70) 
SCORE   -0.199   -0.015 
   (1.56)   (1.24) 
SCORESQ   -0.028***   -0.027*** 
   (6.55)   (6.47) 
DERBY   0.737***   0.739*** 
   (7.86)   (8.05) 
MONTHSTOGO   0.073***   0.073*** 
   (10.09)    (10.35) 
HOMEPOINTS   -0.099**   -0.090** 
   (2.32)   (2.15) 
AWAYPOINTS   0.160***   0.176*** 
   (4.06)   (4.58) 
CONSTANT 2.753***  0.333  3.203***  0.588 
 (37.89)  (0.74)  (37.74) (1.32) 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  11169 10904 11169 10904 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 25 
 
Table 7: OLS and referee fixed effects models for the number of yellow and red 
cards per game, confined to referees observed in the pre- and post-salary contract 
eras 
VARIABLES OLS  OLS  FE  FE 
TIER 1  0.551*** 0.375*** 0.365*** 0.236** 
  (7.30) (4.23) (3.84) (2.28) 
POST00/01  0.135  0.076 -0.023 -0.104 
  (1.01) (0.57) (0.17) (0.79) 
TIER 1 × POST00/01  -0.462*** -0.395*** -0.522*** -0.461*** 
  (4.94) (4.22) (5.19) (4.59) 
LOGATTEND   0.196***   0.209*** 
   (3.45)   (3.76) 
SCORE   -0.027*   -0.023 
   (1.86)   (1.64) 
SCORESQ   -0.028***   -0.027*** 
   (5.74)   (5.77) 
DERBY   0.831***   0.823*** 
   (8.18)   (8.28) 
MONTHSTOGO   0.080***   0.080*** 
   (9.79)    (10.06) 
HOMEPOINTS   -0.050   -0.054 
   (1.06)   (1.16) 
AWAYPOINTS   0.173***   0.191*** 
   (3.92)   (4.44) 
CONSTANT 2.893***  0.566  3.148***  0.660 
 (33.72)  (1.08)  (35.23)  (1.29) 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  8516 8301 8516 8301 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
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